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JURISDICTION
The case was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0). The case
was then poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1) The first question posed by the appellee/cross-appellant for the Court of Appeals is
whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial Court to default Mr. Sykes for filing a list of
witnesses that the trial court judged to be too long and to fail to grant a new trial when moved to do

so. The appropriate standard here is abuse of discretion. The question here are listed out of order of
the time of filing because if the Court decides that the Court was not justified in defaulting Mr. Sykes
and orders a new trial then the Court need not approach the second issue.

2) The second issue is posed by the appellant: Was the trial court justified in modifying the
jury award and thereby reducing the total amount awarded to $76,000 with prejudgment interest of
$65,693.52 for a total judgment of $141,693.52. The appropriate standard of review is a bit
problematic. Th- order of the court indicated that the Court was granting a reopening and alteration
of the verdict. The Court also indicated that it was granting a judgment N.O.V. The first question
for the Appeals Court is to characterize the nature of what was granted in order to establish a
standard of review. The normal thrust of a J.N.O.V. is to reverse the jury and to grant judgment to
the opposing party. Here the issue of liability had been resolved by the Court's default of Mr. Sykes.
What the Court actually did was to reopen the verdict and reduce the amount of damages. If the
decision of the trial Court is seen as a J.N.O.V. then the correct standard is the "correctness" standard
or the trial court had to be correct in its decision. If the decision of the Court is seen as a re-opening
and modification of the decision then the correct standard is the "abuse of discretion standard".
Since the reality of the decision was a modification and not a reversal, the better
characterization appears to be that of a reopening and modification which would mean that the
appropriate standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES
RULES OR REGULATIONS
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Constitution of Utah Article I Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Constitution of the United States Amendment 5
... nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The original counter claim was filed by Mr. Hatch et. al. in 1981 (R 80) and amended
several times since then. The principal claims by Mr. Hatch are:
1) He was the owner of a piece of land that was about to be sold at trustee sale.
2) Virginia Flynn had agreed to rescue Mr. Hatch et al. from the sale.
3) Mr Sykes, Zions Bank and Zions Bank's attorney scared her off by claiming that a lawsuit
was possible and imminent.
4) The land was sold at trustee sale.
5) Mr. Christiansen bought the property on behalf of Mr. Sykes.
Mr. Sykes (R 36) claimed that
1) Mr. Hatch had agreed to sell him the property.
2) Mr. Hatch had signed a contract to that effect.
3) Mr. Hatch had welched on the deal and was trying to destroy Mr. Sykes claim.
4) Mr. Sykes was the true owner of the property
The case has been off and on for years due to the antipathy of the litigants and the fact that

Mr. Hatch and some of the other plaintiffs have been in and out of bankruptcy several times during
the period. The three cases were all consolidated since they the same basis and the same issues. The
root cause of the controversy is a piece of property in Provo which Mr. Sykes and Mr. Hatch both
claimed to own. The two parties had entered into an agreement for Mr Sykes to buy the South half
of a piece of property from Mr. Hatch. Then things got sticky. Mr. Sykes claimed that Mr. Hatch had
agreed to sell him the North half of the property and had signed a document to that effect. Mr. Hatch
claimed that the document was a fake and that he had never agreed to sell the North half of the
property to Mr. Sykes. Mr. Hatch also claimed that many evil deeds were perpetrated by Mr. Sykes
including picking cherries, grazing animals on the land and illegal fertilization with pond sediment.
He also claims that Mr. Sykes had a duty to water the grass which he didn't fulfill.
Mr. Hatch claimed that because of Mr. Sykes vigorous pursuit of his claim to the property
a person willing to loan money on the property (Virginia Flynn) was scared off. Mr. Hatch claims
that the money would have saved the property from foreclosure by Zions Bank.
The money was not loaned to Mr. Hatch and therefore the property rights of Mr. Hatch were
foreclosed and the property was sold to Mr. Christiansen at a sheriffs sale.
In addition, the water shares to the property were transferred to Mr. Sykes by Provo title at
the behest of the previous owner (Raggozines). Mr. Hatch has accused Mr. Sykes of improperly
obtaining these rights and has sued both Provo title and Mr. Sykes for return of those shares.
Mr. Hatch filed suit against Mr. Sykes, Zions Bank, Mr. Christiansen and Zions Bank's
lawyers. Mr. Hatch settled his problems with Zions and Zions lawyers for a cash payment. Due to
the settlement and the affirmation of the sheriffs sale, Mr. Christiansen was dismissed from the suit
on his motion. On separate motion, all claims against Mr. Sykes were also dismissed after the trial
7

court determined that, with no claim on the property Mr. Hatch no longer had a cause of action
against Mr. Sykes. Mr. Sykes counterclaims against Mr. Hatch and the Ragozzines were also
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
The dismissals were appealed by all parties except Mr. Christiansen. The Appeals Court
affirmed the dismissals of claims against Mr. Christiansen and Mr. Hatch but ordered that the trial
court hold a trial on Mr. Hatch's claims against Mr. Sykes.
At the pre-trial hearing a decision was reached on the number of witnesses to be called :
"The plaintiffs and the defendant are limited to six character witnesses. There
is no limit for the amount of fact witnesses, provided they are named on the final
witness list.
The clerk is to advise Judge Mower on January 10,1995, the total number of
witnesses who will be called to testify at trial. This will assist Judge Mower to
determine if additional trial time is required." (Minute entry, 9/2/94 [R 1363]).

After the pre-trial hearing Mr. Primavera asked for and received leave to terminate his participation
in the case. (R 1440) At this point Mr. Sykes attempted to follow through pro se. Mr. Sykes
presented a witness list of those who "may be called" (R 1520). Mr. Hatch also amended his witness
list to add additional witnesses. No objection to Mr. Sykes' witness list was filed by Mr. Hatch.
On February 1 1995 (5 days prior to trial) the Court sua sponte issued an order sanctioning
Mr. Sykes for the witness list that he had filed. Incredibly, the sanction was not a limited number of
witnesses regardless of the list, nor was it a declaration of who would or would not be heard nor even
money sanctions. The sanction of the Court was a complete default by Mr. Sykes and his
codetendants (R 1757). The trial Court ordered that Mr. Sykes would not be allowed to appear and
defend against liability in this action. The trial Court also ruled that a bench trial would be held on
the issue of damages. Then when Mr. Hatch objected, Judge Mower changed his mind and decided
8

on a jury trial and reduced trial time from 6 to 5 days. When Dwane Sykes showed up for trial on
February 6 1995 he discovered for the first time that there would be a jury trial instead of a bench
trial. He was then told that he would have a limited right to cross-examine but could call no
witnesses. During the period of trial a tremendous latitude was granted to Mr. Hatch including hints
and prods from the Court on what to include. Mr. Sykes, on the other hand, was severely
circumscribed in what he was allowed. At one time, in the presence of the jury, Mr. Sykes was told
to shut up and sit down or go to jail.
After a 3 day jury trial on February 6-8 1995, predictably, the jury entered a verdict imposing
liability on all defendants of $509,942 (R 1985). The judgement was entered on April 14 1995.
Subsequently, Mr. Sykes and his codefendants engaged Mr. Clarke Nielsen as counsel. A
post trial motion was made by all defendants to "set aside, and alter the judgments and for
judgement N.O.V. or for a new trial." (R 2068 & R 2071) Subsequently, a settlement was reached
in which Patricia Sykes and Dennis Sykes were dismissed from the action. The Court denied the
motion for a new trial and denied the motion to set aside the default verdict but agreed to modify the
verdict and for J.N.O. V. (R 2355) in which the judgment was reduced to:
Conversion of Water stock Slander of Title and interference with business relationship Prejudgment interest Punitive damages -

$ 1,000.00
$50,000.00
$65,693.52
$25,000.00

Total judgment -

$141,693.52

Mr. Hatch appealed the reduction in damages done by the Court and Mr. Sykes cross
appealed his default by the Court and the denial by the Court of his motions to set aside his default
and for a new trial.
9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF MR. HATCH

1. Three days for trial was not sufficient to present his whole case and Dwane Sykes was
disruptive during the trial.
2. The jury's water stock conversion award of $6,000 was justified by the evidence.
3. The jury's trespass award of $30,000 was justified by the evidence.
4. The jury's slander of title award of $105,000 was justified by the evidence.
5. The jury's interference in an advantageous business relationship award of $ 10,000 was
justified by the evidence.
6. The jury's award of $225,000 in punitive damages was justified by the evidence.

SUMMARY OF MR. SYKES' ARGUMENTS
The defaulting of Mr. Sykes was not justified for an over long witness list where he received
no notice or warning of a default, and where there was no order of the trial Coun regarding the
number of witnesses allowed on the witness list. There was no prejudice to any party by the length
of the list and the Court had perfectly rational and easy ways of handling the problem that did not
require default.
Mr. Sykes did not receive due process guaranteed by the Utah and U.S. constitutions. When
there is a question, the Court should err in favor of a trial on the merits.
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ARGUMENT

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DEFAULTING MR. SYKES FOR HAVING A WITNESS LIST
THAT WAS TOO LONG?
Dwane Sykes was denied a fair trial and due process when the Court entered a default against
him a mere four days prior to trial without prior notice to him or an opportunity to be heard (R1757).
Mr. Sykes was defaulted for the submission of a witness list that was longer than the trial
court wanted. There was no warning, no hearing and no prior notice. Such a draconian solution was
uncalled for and was an abuse of discretion. It would have been a simple matter for the Trial Court
to merely limit Mr. Sykes to a certain number of witnesses or allow him to use his time however he
wished. A limitation of witnesses would have served the interests of a speedy trial without such a
severe sanction. The case had been pending for 15+ years. Literally years worth of effort and one trip
already to the Utah Court of Appeals were wiped out in a fit of spleen by the trial court. The
imposition of a default as a sanction was uncommonly harsh, inequitable and unnecessary.
Entering default for a disobedient defendant is the most severe of the potential
sanctions that can be imposed on a non-responding party.
See Utah Dept. Of Transportation v. Osguthorpe. 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1995).
But, a real question exists of whether or not Mr. Sykes was actually disobedient. The pre-trial
order did not limit the number of witnesses that could be listed on the witness list. Indeed, the minute
entry following the pre-trial hearing the number of witnesses was declared to be unlimited (R 1363).
The pre-trial order merely limited the number of character witnesses to six. There was also no danger
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of Mr. Sykes monopolizing the entire trial with his set of witnesses. The trial Judge had already
decreed that each side would have an equal amount of time (17 hours [R 1443]) in which to present
his case.
No party should be defaulted unless the grounds upon which such default is authorized
are clearly and authoritatively established and are in such clear and certain terms that
the party to be defaulted can know, without question, that he is subject to default if he
does not act in a certain fashion.

See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure. §2681, p.5(1983).
Mr. Sykes could not possibly have known that he was risking a default by presenting a long
list of witnesses. There was no warning by the Court. The order for default was a bolt out of the blue.
Mr. Sykes had not been limited to a finite number of witnesses. Instead the number of witnesses
would be limited by the time allowed to present the case.
Any doubt about a default should be resolved in favor of setting it aside.
See Interstate Excavating Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980).
The doubts in this case are manifest. There was a far less draconian way for the trial Court
to handle the question of the number of witnesses. Indeed, the Court really didn't have to handle the
question at all. The length of the trial was self-limiting as to the number of witnesses. When Mr.
Sykes' time was up, then his presentation of testimony was through. The Court had no reason on
its own motion to default Mr. Sykes. Mr. Hatch had not objected to the witness list. There was no
reason for the Court to care.
What evil was Mr. Sykes perpetrating with his long witness list? Mr Hatch (the plaintiff) did
not object. Discovery had been closed long before (R 1443) so there was no prejudice at all to Mr.
Hatch. The trial Court could simply have used the list as it was intended - as a list of potential
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witnesses. If Mr. Sykes attempted to call someone who was not on the list then the Trial Court could
simply not allow it. If Mr. Sykes wanted to burn up all of his time on the first few witnesses on his
list, that would have been to the advantage of Mr. Hatch and the Trial Court could simply indicate
to Mr. Sykes that his time was up.
This case has been pending for 15 years. The case has already been once to the Court of
Appeals.. The Trial Court was completely unjustified, after the hundreds of documents filed by both
sides, which were undeniably wild and crazy, when it picked out one document ( which was utterly
harmless) and then defaulted Mr. Sykes because of it. The Court in its original order of default
called "Order Regarding Court Availability" (R 1757) states
"The limits included both time limits and limits as to the total number of witnesses to
be called."
The trial Court was laboring under a false impression. The limit on witnesses was only a limit
on character witnesses. The Court also ordered in the same order that Mr Sykes "would not be
allowed to appear and defend this action/9 On 2 February 1995 default was entered against Mr.
Sykes. The Court also ordered that a one day bench trial would be held. Some time later on 2
February 1995 the trial Court reverses itself and allows Mr. Hatch a jury trial (R 1770) Four days
later (again with no notice) on the day of the trial the Court reversed itself again and ordered that Mr.
Sykes could defend himself (prepared or not) only on the damages issue. He was not allowed to call
witnesses. He was only allowed to cross-examine.
The Court apparently realized the severity of its sanction, its mistake as to the number of
witnesses allowed and the irregularity of the trial proceedings because the Court then issue another
order called "order of default" in which additional reasons are given for the default imposed.
In its order (R 2059) the Court states:
14

"It was agreed by the parties and confirmed by the later order of the later court order
that only approximately 22 people could be expected to be called by each side and no
more than 6 "character witnesses" ".
While the Court is correct in stating that the number of witnesses was expected to be 22,
there is no mention that the witness list is to be limited to 22. So, Mr. Sykes did not disobey the pretrial order in submitting a witness list longer than 22. Indeed, Mr. Sykes himself indicated his
understanding that, in all likelihood, not all of these witness would be called by listing the witnesses
as "may be called". (R 1383, R 1520).
The Court then adds a new complaint in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable (R 2059):
"bombarded by a myriad of disparate requests, objections and ex parte motions, some
mailed, some faxed, but none of them strictly meeting the form requirements set down
by the rules, all during a time reserved for trial preparations/'
If the Court in this case intended to default any parties for filing inappropriate, improperly
formatted, repetitive and frivolous motions, objections and proposed orders then it would have to
default both parties. There is no realistic mechanism for separating the goose from the gander in this
case, in terms of sloppy and inappropriate filings. For the trial Court to pick out one of these parties
for draconian punishment for improper form is pure abuse of discretion. However this after the fact
justification for the default simply does not square with the truth. The Court stated its real reasons
for defaulting Mr. Sykes in its order of 2 Febmary 1995 (R 1757). The true reason for the default of
Mr. Sykes is simply the length of his witness list. There was no other reason. The order (R 2059)
issued three months after the actual order of default (R1757), which attempted to provide other
justification for the default, does not represent the true reasons why Mr. Sykes was defaulted.
Mr. Sykes was entitled to defend on the damages issue even if he were defaulted on the issue
of liability. Mr. Sykes did not find out until the day of trial that he would be allowed even his limited
15

cross examination. Mr. Sykes had no time at all to prepare. Such a right to cross examine is no right
at all.
When Defendants have entered their appearance and participate in pretrial matters,
they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to appear, cross-examine witnesses, and
present evidence on the damage issues even after their default.

See Rodriguez v. Conant. 737 P.2d 527, 105 N.M. 746 (1987).
Mr. Sykes was not given an opportunity to present his side of the case. He was given only
a limited opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Hatch's witnesses. He was not allowed to call any of this
own.
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue of damages once the Defendant's default
has been entered.

See Amiga Mutual Insurance Co, v, fichettler, 768 P.2d 956 (Utah App. 1989).
Upon entry of the Defendant's default, Howard Hatch was not entitled to a jury trial on the
damages under Rule 55, Utah R. Civ. P. And the Court should not have allowed a jury trial without
notice to Mr. Sykes.
First there was to be a jury trial. Then, there was not. Then, there was again. No notice was
given to Mr. Sykes so that he could prepare for a jury or for the Court. Indeed, Mr. Sykes was not
even aware of whether or not he would be able to ask questions or present any case at all until the
day of the trial. Even the best of trial attorneys would be hard pressed to simply jump into trial with
no preparation. Mr. Sykes could not have done any kind of reasonable job in defending himself. In
remitting the case for trial on the merits after the trial court had stricken a party's pleadings and
granted default judgment to the other party for failure to appear at a deposition or provide the
requested documents the Utah Supreme Court states:
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"The language of the rule as presently worded is permissive, rather than mandatory,
wherein it states: that the court may make such orders ... as are just and ... **may take
any action..." etc. This grants the court discretionary authority to impose the sanctions
mentioned. It is true that where the authority to perform a proposed action rests within
the discretion of the court we must allow considerable latitude in which he may exercise
his judgment. But this does not mean that the court has unrestrained power to act in
an arbitrary manner. Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law is the principle that
reason and justice shall prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one
person; and that this applies to all men in every status: to courts and judges, as well as
autocrats or bureaucrats. The meaning of the term "discretion" itself imports that the
action should be taken within reason and good conscience in the interest of protecting
the rights of both parties and serving the ends of justice. It has always been the policy
of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on
the merits of a controversy. "
See Carmen v. Slavens 546 P.2d 601, 603 ( Utah 1976).
Mr. Sykes is entitled to a trial on the merits.

MR. SYKES WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS

"The Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7 provides: No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The Court has explained the due
process guarantee as follows:
Neither a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional
right or deprive such person of a vested interest in property without any
opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due
process of law. Many attempts have been made to further define a due process"
but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day n court - that
is each party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record just made. "
Thus the essential requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded his "day
in court." It has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of
permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of the controversy."

See Celebrity Club inc. V. Utah Liquor Control Commission 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah
17

1982).
Mr. Sykes was deprived of his "day in court" because his witness list was too long. He was
given no notice. He was given no warning. He was given no hearing. Mr. Sykes did not receive the
due process guaranteed by the Utah and U.S. Constitutions.

II. WAS THE REOPENING OF THE CASE AND
REDUCTION OF DAMAGES JUSTIFIED?
LENGTH OF TRIAL IS COMPLAINED OF TO NO PURPOSE

Mr. Hatch begins his argument with a lengthy complaint about having only three days of trial
to establish his damages. He also complains about the behavior of Mr. Sykes during the trial.
Curiously, Mr, Hatch then states:
"Mr Hatch does not necessarily fault the Court for the limited time allotted for him to
put on his case, but he does fault Dwane Sykes for his many unjustified intrusions and
lengthy and unnecessary time spent on cross examination"
(See Brief of Appellant pg 13) This statement negates the entire puipose of such a discussion. I am
unaware of any case that has been reversed due to error on the part of the opposing party. Mr. Hatch
offers no such precedent. I must assume that Mr. Hatch merely was looking for a forum to vent his
spleen or intending to provide filler for his brief, since no relief is requested or trial Court error
alleged, nor was this issue raised in the Appellant's docketing statement.
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WATER STOCK CONVERSION

Mr. Hatch states that his opinion on what the water stock might have been worth is sufficient
evidence for the jury to award four to six times that much. Mr. Hatch admits that the only evidence
offered (Mr. Hatch's opinion) sets the value of the stock at $1000-$1500 (R-3343). The jury, without
a shred of additional evidence, then finds the value of the water stock to be $6,000 (R 1985). Mr.
Hatch argues that the jury lumped punitive damages together with compensatory damages to arrive
at the $6,000 figure. Aside from the fact that Mr. Hatch has absolutely no evidence to support that
assumption, the jury made a separate finding of punitive damages. If Mr. Hatch is correct in his pure
speculation on the actions of the jury in lumping together punitive and compensatory damages then
he simply adds another reason for J.N.O.V. since the jury obviously did not understand their
instructions and mixed various damages together in an improper manner.
The simple fact is that the only available evidence on the value of the water stock is Mr.
Hatch's unqualified and self serving opinion of $1000-$ 1500. Had Mr. Hatch properly presented
his case he would have produced documentary evidence and/or expert (or at least knowledgeable)
testimony on the actual value of the water stock. The jury was without justification in snatching
another value out of the air($6,000), and Judge Mower was correct in bringing the verdict ($ 1,000)
back into line with the testimony.

19

TRESPASS

This is perhaps the most interesting of all the claims for damages because it is the most
nebulous. Mr. Hatch Asserts that: Mr. Sykes trespassed on his property and put some horses on it,
collected money for rent, picked pie cherries, posted a sign saying no trespassing and took down
some signs which were offering to sell the property.
HORSES
The evidence offered as to the horses placed on the property was sketchy at best. Mr.
Christiansen, who actually owned the property through the majority of the time of the pendency of
this case has stated that he had grazed horses on the property. No evidence has been offered
indicating the time frame of the grazing or who owned the property when the horses were grazed.
No evidence was offered as to how many horses were placed on the property or when or how long.
Nor was any evidence offered as to what damage, if any, that the horses did. There is no way for the
Court to judge what damage if any was done by horses, or when or for how long. Indeed, it can be
considered that horses on a piece of property actually could improve the property by keeping weeds
down, demonstrating that the property was "horse property", adding natural fertilizer to the land and
creating a peaceful bucolic scene. The presence of horses on the property can be properly argued
as a mitigating circumstance which actually added value to the property. There is no evidence to the
contrary.
RENT
It was stated in testimony that Mr. Sykes was renting out the property as pasture and collected
20

rent on it. Again, there are the same question: When, how many, how long, how much etc. A bald
statement that Mr. Sykes rented the pasture out provides no guidance whatsoever in establishing
what damage, if any, was caused. The pasture might have been rented out once for a church social
with the charge being $.10. The pasture might have been rented out to a mining company to mine
gold at a cost of $10,000/hr . There is no evidence. The value picked by the jury ($3().0()0) is
completely unsubstantiated.
PIE CHERRIES
Mr. Sykes also is alleged to have picked pie cherries. Here again there is little or nothing on
which to base an award. How many cherries - Two, two hundred, two million9 When were the
cherries picked. What state were they in. Did Mr. Hatch intend to pick the cherries9 Had he ever in
the past picked the cherries? What was the market value of cherries at the time 9 All of these
questions remain unanswered. The evidence in the case offers nothing except a bald assertion that
some pie cherries were picked by Mr. Sykes. The evidence is insufficient to show any loss at all
much less ($30,000).
FOR SALE SIGNS
Mr. Hatch also alleges that Mr. Sykes took out some for sale signs. There is no allegation that
this caused any damages to the property itself. However, one might reasonably assume that this
action deprived Mr. Hatch of a potential buyer for the property. In view of the subsequent loss of the
property to foreclosure this action of Mr. Sykes could be considered significant. But the loss of the
property (in terms of damages) is compensated in the slander of title and interference with
advantageous business relationship claims). Were the Court to award a separate amount for this
action there would be a duplication or award for the same damage. The valuation of what the loss
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of the property cost Mr. Hatch is done subsequently.
There was insufficient evidence to produce any realistic valuation of damages. The jury was
simply left to pick a number out of the air; which they did. The jury had absolutely no basis for
determining an award for trespass and the Court correctly reduced that award to zero.

SLANDER OF TITLE AND INTERFERENCE WITH AN
ADVANTAGEOUS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP

The damages for interference with an advantageous business relationship and the damages
for the slander of title claim are identical. The claimed advantageous relationship was an attempt to
secure a mortgage on the property (which Mr. Hatch subsequently lost to foreclosure). There was
no independent loss from the falling apart of the mortgage arrangement that is not encompassed by
the loss of the property. Likewise the only loss due to the claim of slander of title was the loss of the
property to foreclosure. So separate awards for these two claims would be a double recovery. The
proper value of this claim is the value of the property that was lost.
It is undisputed that the property was valued at $30,000 to $35,000 per acre. The property
was 3 acres in size given a total maximum valuation of $105,000. There were however, two
outstanding undisputed encumbrances on the property. There was a first mortgage of $25,000 to
Zion's bank and $30,000 to the University Avenue Development Association. That leaves a net
equity of $50,000. That is the value of what was lost by Mr. Hatch. Were he to sell at the time that
he lost the property his return would have been $50,000 not $105,000.
The jury ignored the evidence of the two mortgages to reach their verdict of 105,000 . The
Court, in its Judgment J.N.O.V., simply applied the undisputed evidence which had been presented
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to arrive at the figure of $50,000.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Mr. Hatch argues that $75,000 in punitive damages is reasonable and supported by the
evidence. Punitive damages are derivative damages. They can be awarded only in the presence of
actual damages. The Court stated that since the actually damages were considerably reduced from
what the jury awarded and considering the financial circumstance of the Mr. Sykes that the jury
award of $75,000 was excessive. Accordingly the Court awarded $25,000 to more closely conform
to Mr. Sykes' financial state and to the actual damages awarded.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Mr. Hatch urges that under the Real Estate Contract signed for the sale of the North half of
the property that he is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. He makes this argument based on his
recovery of $1,000 for loss of his water stock. Mr. Hatch is trying to pull the proverbial camel
through the eye of a needle. Mr. Hatch has claimed damages in excess of Vi million dollars from the
beginning of the suit. The issue between the parties was never over the water rights. If such had been
the case then the issue could have been settled in small claims court or even a settlement of the issue
would have long since occurred. The issue between the parties was over the loss of the property and
the major league claims that Mr. Hatch was making for damages. Mr. Sykes has spent his health, his
sanity, his family and thousands of dollars on legal fees to fight this case. If he could have settled it
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for the cost of the water rights 15 years ago then there is no doubt that the case would have ended
long ago.
The clause in the Real Estate Contract referring to legal fees is irrelevant to this case. The
property at issue here is not the property that is the subject of the Real Estate Contract. This cause
of action dealt only tangentially with the water rights issue. The real issue here was the ownership
of the North Vi of the property and whether Mr. Sykes was justified in his pursuit of it.

REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF DAMAGES

Cleared of all of the drivel this is the basic event which led to the lawsuit. Mr. Hatch lost his
property and he claims that Mr. Sykes caused it. It is uncontested that Mr. Hatch had $5().0(X) equity
in the property. Mr. Hatch also claims that Mr. Sykes is responsible for the loss of water stock valued
(in his own opinion) at $1,000 - $1,500. Therefore, Mr. Hatch lost at most $51,500. The Court
actually awarded $51,000. The trial Court also awarded $25,000 in punitive damages and $65,693.52
in pre-judgment interest. Making a total verdict of $141,693.52. Contrast that award with the jury\s
verdict of over $500,000 after adding in pre-judgment interest. The verdict of the jury is far beyond
any reasonable calculation of damages. One half million dollars for the actual loss of $50,000 can
not be supported by the facts of this case. The judge was correct to reopen the verdict of the jury.
The measure of damages given by the court as a result of the motion is the only reasonable course
the Trial Court could take given the instant facts and evidence offered.

24

MR. HATCH WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

The evidence is insufficient to support any damages awarded, in that Howard Hatch had
conveyed his interest in the property by Special Warrantee Deed to the University Avenue
Development Associates [hereinafter U.A.D.A.] on August 28, 1981 and stated that U.A.D.A is was
the real party in interest. U.A.D.A. was a party to the suit prior to be dismissed by this Court when
it failed to appeal the dismissal of the case (R 1132)
Mr. Hatch had passed his interest in the disputed property to U.A.D.A. prior to the time that
any of the alleged acts of Mr. Sykes occurred. In his warrantee deed Howard Hatch conveyed all of
his right and title to the property to U.A.D.A. (R 1910 Exhibits 82 -85). The deed was not recorded
till later but such a late recording does not negate the transfer of title that occurred.
Although the deed wasn't recorded until later, the transfer of title was operative
between the parties at the time of delivery.
See Crowther v. Mower. 876 P.2d 876 (Utah App. 1994).
The evidence shows unequivocally that Mr. Hatch was not damaged by any actions of Mr.
Sykes. Mr. Hatch was not the owner of the property in question during any of the actions of Mr.
Sykes. He was only a partner in U.A.D.A. which was a limited partnership. Any recovery from Mr.
Sykes would have to be in favor of U.A.D.A.. Earlier in the litigation, U.A.D.A. was a party to this
action. However, U.A.D.A. failed to appeal an earlier dismissal of the action and so was dismissed
by this Court. Therefore, no damages should have been granted at all against Mr. Sykes.
When property is held by a partnership then the partnership is the real party in
interest and no individual partner has a separate cognizable interest.
See Canlener v. United Savings Nat'1 Rank. 317 Or 506, 857 P.2d 830 (1993).
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Sykes actually wants a chance to present his case and feels that the default imposed on
him by the Court only a few days before trial was unwarranted, arbitrary and capricious. There were
simply better ways to handle a long witness list than to default the party that presented it. Mr. Sykes
is entitled to his "day in court" as much as Mr. Hatch. Mr. Sykes was not given the due process
required by law. Mr. Sykes asks the Court to overturn the verdict of the trial Court and remit the case
for a trial on the merits.
Mr. Hatch was not even the real party in interest in this action. The evidence unequivocally
shows that Mr. Hatch had transferred his interest to U.A.D.A. prior to the events complained of here.
Mr. Hatch is not entitled to a double recovery on his property (one from U.A.D.A. and one from Mr.
Sykes).
Mr. Sykes also reasons that a V2 million dollar award by the jury for the loss of equity of
$50,000 is ludicrous. The only reasonable valuation of the property was done by a professional
appraiser at $105,000. Mr. Hatch had undisputed mortgages on the property of $55,000. The only
evidence offered for the value of the water stock was $1000-$ 1500. The total loss of Mr. Hatch was
$51,000. Adding punitive damages of $25,000 and pre-judgment interest the total award given by
the Court was $141,693.52. The Trial Court took the next best action to actually granting Mr. Sykes
his day in Court. The Trial Court reduced the jury award to what could possibly be supported by the
evidence. If Mr. Sykes is not granted a new trial then he asks the Court to affirm the decision by the
trial court.
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